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This Paper provides a detailed description of fiscal federal relations in Australian. 
The keystone to those relationships is the application by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission of the principle of fiscal equalisation — that each State should be able to 
provide the same standard of services to its population, if it operates at the same level of 
efficiency and makes the same effort to raise revenues from its own sources.   
The Paper pays particular attention to the processes by which this principle is 
implemented.  It illustrates the extent to which expenditure needs as well as revenue 
capacities are measured and the impacts these assessments have on the per capita 
distribution of grant revenues between the Australian States. 
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The Australian Federation was formed in 1901 when the six British colonies on the 
Australian continent asked the British Government to pass legislation to form the 
Commonwealth of Australia.  One of those colonies, South Australia, brought the 
Northern Territory into the Federation with it as a Commonwealth Territory.  In 1913, 
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) was formed when, as required by the 
Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament annexed an area from New South Wales so 
that the national capital, Canberra, could be constructed. 
The Commonwealth gave self government to the Northern Territory in 1978 and to the 
ACT in 1989.  For most practical purposes, the powers and responsibilities of the 
Territories’ Parliaments are now the same as those of the six States. 
The States
2 vary in population from nearly 6.5 million in New South Wales to about 200 
000 in the Northern Territory.  In 2000-01, their budgets range from over $31 billion
3 in 
New South Wales to less than $2 billion in the ACT
4.  In area, Western Australia is the 
largest at over 2.5 million km
2 and the ACT the smallest at 2 400 km
2.  Attachment A 
holds further basic statistics on each of the States. 
                                                 
1   Bob Searle is the Secretary (Chief Executive Officer) of the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
in Australia.  This paper has been written with the support of the International Centre for 
Economic Research, Torino, and the University of Torino, Department of Economics. 
2   Hereafter, the term State(s) includes the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory 
unless the context requires otherwise. 
3   Australian dollars have been used as the unit of financial data throughout this paper.  At the time 
of writing the paper, the market valued $1A very close to $0.50US. 
4   Budgets are measured by the general government operating expenses according to accrual based 
Government Finance Statistics.           
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Because the central government was established by the States, it is the central 
government (the Commonwealth) that has the clearer list of legislative responsibilities.  
Attachment B  provides an extract of  The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, detailing the powers of the central government.  Commonwealth powers have 
been amended by referendum only twice — in 1946 when Section 51 (xxiiia) was added 
to give social security p owers to the central government, and in 1967 when the 
Commonwealth was given power to make laws in respect of the indigenous 
(Aboriginal) races.  This does not mean, however, that the balance of power within the 
Australian Federation has been stable since it was formed. 
When the colonies agreed to federate, they thought they had designed a constitution that 
would ensure their continued financial independence.  Within ten years, however, the 
Commonwealth was found to have ‘surplus’ funds each year and a system of fixed per 
capita grants to each State was implemented.  Section 96 of the Constitution has been 
used ever since to transfer excess central government funds to the States.  It states that: 
During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and 
thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant 
financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament 
thinks fit. 
Although not designed for the purpose, this section of the Constitution has been a major 
avenue through which the Commonwealth has expanded its influence in the public 
sector.   
All countries that have more than one level of government, whether a Federation or a 
unitary country, need some way of transferring resources or responsibilities from one 
level to another.  The levels of government never have precisely the revenue capacity to 
match their expenditure responsibilities.  There is always some vertical fiscal imbalance 
or VFI.  In Australia, the VFI is very much in favour of the central government.  This is 
the position countries most frequently experience, but VFI in favour of States or 
Provinces is not unknown. 
An important element of the fiscal transfer system in Australia is that, as well as 






(HFI).  The joint aims within the Australian Federation are to transfer fiscal capacity to 
the States and municipal government, and to do so in a way that gives each jurisdiction, 
when added to their own revenue raising capacity, equal capacity to provide services.   
Because of its much greater significance in the Australian federal financial system, this 
paper concentrates on the transfers from the Commonwealth to the States.  There are 
smaller t ransfers to municipal government which, to a large extent, are also aimed 
jointly at overcoming both VFI and HFI, and the distribution of much of those funds is 
on a similar basis to that used in Commonwealth-State arrangements.   
Distribution of Responsibilities and Powers in the Australian Federation 
Table 1 shows the practical distribution of responsibilities and powers between the three 
levels of Government in Australia in 1999-2000, based on actual revenue and 
expenditure patterns.  It uses a General Finance Statistics classification based on the 
United Nations’ System of National Accounts. 
The most noticeable aspect of Table 1 is that while the sources of revenue are generally 
specific to one level of government, the expenditure pattern is much more complex.  
This has arisen largely because of: 
?? a belief (of at least the Commonwealth) that many revenues are 
more efficiently collected centrally;  
?? a conviction by the Commonwealth that it can manage the national 
economy more readily if it has greater revenue collection 
authority;           
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Table 1  Australian Public Sector 1999-2000 
   Per cent of Item at level    
Item  Commonwealth  State  Local 
Item as per 
cent of total 
REVENUE (a)         
Income Tax         
     Individuals  100.0    40.5 
     Enterprises  100.0    14.3 
     Non-residents  100.0    0.6 
Pay-roll Tax  27.8 72.2  6.0 
Taxes on property         
     Land tax     100.0  0.9 
     Municipal rates      100.0 2.9 
     Financial & cap trans.    100.0  4.7 
     Other property taxes    100.0  0.8 
Taxes on provision of goods and services         
     Sales Tax   100.0    7.6 
     Excise & Levies         
          Commonwealth Excise Act  100.0    6.8 
          Agricultural Production  100.0    0.3 
          On Public Corporations  59.6 40.4  1.6 
     Taxes  on International Trade  100.0 0.0  1.8 
     Taxes on Gambling  0.0 100.0  2.1 
     Taxes on Insurance  0.0 100.0  3.2 
Taxes on activities and use of goods         
     Motor Vehicle Taxes    100.0  1.9 
     Franchise Fees    100.0  2.9 
     Other Taxes  56.7 43.3  0.4 
Mining Revenue(b)     100.0  0.6 
Total Revenue  74.8 22.3 2.9 100.0 
         
EXPENDITURE (c)         
General Public Services  54.1 31.3 14.6 6.8 
Defence  100.0    4.1 
Public Order and Safety  11.8 85.3 2.9 3.7 
Education  30.7 69.1 0.1 12.9 
Health  53.3 46.1 0.6 16.9 
Social Security and Welfare  90.7 8.1 1.2 24.2 
Housing and Community Amenities  20.4 42.0 37.6 3.5 
Recreation and Culture  24.3 43.8 31.9 2.3 
Fuel and Energy  69.9 29.7 0.4 0.9 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting  41.2 58.5 0.3 1.7 
Mining, Manufacturing Construction, etc.  63.0 26.8 10.2 0.5 
Transport and Communication   13.5 58.8 27.7 5.8 
Other  Economic Affairs   49.4 42.2 8.3 2.5 
Public Debt Transactions  62.3 35.1 2.5 6.5 
Other Purposes  93.0 5.7 1.3 7.8 
Total Expenditure  59.3 35.0 5.7 100.0 
(a) Australian Bureau of Statistics, Taxation Revenue Australia, 1999-2000 Catalogue No. 5506.0. 
(b) Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2001 Update Report Supplementary Information p 78. 







?? an unwillingness of the States and the Commonwealth to share 
access to the major tax bases; and 
?? the Commonwealth’s use of the tied grants power (section 96 of 
the Constitution) to influence the standard of most of the services 
provided by the States (for example, although the Commonwealth 
has no power in education and health, nearly 60 per cent of outlays 
in those areas are from its budget). 
FISCAL IMBALANCES AND OVERCOMING THEM 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
In 1942, the Commonwealth took over responsibility for the collection of income tax as 
a war time measure, and has held the power ever since.  This has added greatly to 
Commonwealth surpluses and, as a result, the Australian Federation now has one of the 
largest vertical fiscal imbalances measured by the international agencies.  In its 1999-
2000 Budget Papers
5, the Commonwealth Government summarised the VFI in Australia 
diagrammatically as follows. 
                                                 
5   Commonwealth Financial Relations with other levels of Government, 1999-2000, Budget Paper 
No.3, p 15.  Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.           
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Figure 1  General Government Own-source Revenues and Adjusted  
Own-Purpose Outlays 1999-2000 
39 per cent
55 per cent 69 per cent
25 per cent
5 per cent 7 per cent





(a)  Own-source revenue excludes the receipt of payments from other levels of government. 
(b)  The ABS measure of general government own-purpose outlays excludes payments to other levels of 
government and Public Trading Enterprises (PTEs), such as general revenue grants, specific purpose 
payments (SPPs) and advances and subsidies, and interest payments on borrowings for other 
governments and PTEs.  The adjusted measure adds SPPs ‘through’ the States (other than those for 
local government purposes) back in to Commonwealth outlays.  The adjusted measures for both 
Commonwealth and State levels of government abstract from all net advances, which is consistent 
with measures of the underlying deficit. 
This shows very clearly that the Commonwealth raises m uch more revenue than it 
spends and the States rely very heavily on grants from the Commonwealth to be able to 
provide the services they have responsibility for.  The municipal sector also relies on 
transfers of funds from higher levels of government (particularly the Commonwealth), 
but to a lesser extent than the States. 
Some attempts have been made in the past to reduce the VFI.  The States have given the 
Commonwealth full responsibility for funding what would otherwise be their functions 
(such as tertiary education, non-government education and municipal government) and 
the Commonwealth has given the States access to some tax bases (such as payroll tax).  






overhaul of the whole tax system.  This pressure increased when, in August 1997, the 
High Court of Australia found that State tobacco franchise fees were constitutionally 
invalid.  This decision also cast doubt on State liquor and petroleum franchise fees and 
States  ceased to collect them.  Under safety net arrangements, the Commonwealth 
increased its excise taxes on these products and returned the revenues raised to the 
States as revenue replacement payments. 
In June 1999, the Commonwealth and the States signed an Intergovernment Agreement 
on Principles for the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations (IGA) as part 
of the central government's reforms to the Australian tax system.  This involved the 
introduction of a Commonwealth value added tax, called the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST), and the abolition of Commonwealth wholesale sales taxes and a number of State 
taxes, including Financial Institutions Duty.  Under the IGA, the Commonwealth returns 
all the revenue collected from the GST (net of the costs of collection) to the States
6, but 
no longer pays them revenue replacement payments or gives them untied financial 
assistance grants.  During a transition period associated with the introduction of the 
GST, the Commonwealth has guaranteed that the States will be no worse off than under 
the former financial relations. 
As one of the stated aims of this reform was to give States revenue from a more robust 
and growing tax base, it should mean a reduction in the extent of VFI.  However, 
because the Australian constitution requires that the Commonwealth levy the GST, the 
States are even more dependent on the Commonwealth for revenues, particularly as the 
agreement required them to abolish or reduce some of their own taxes. The first year of 
the new tax system in Australia is 2000-01 and the VFI will increase markedly as a 
result.  To give the States some greater security on the grants revenues within their 
budgets, the GST legislation specifies that they have to be involved in any change in the 
rate of the tax, and the Commonwealth has agreed in the IGA that it has no intention of 
reducing the specific purpose payments it makes to the States. 
                                                 
6   The Commonwealth does not refer to this transfer as a grant to the States, preferring to see the 
GST collections as being done on behalf of the States.  It may even go so far as calling the GST 
a State tax.           
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Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance 
In addition to the vertical fiscal imbalance, there is also a considerable degree of 
horizontal fiscal imbalance (HFI) between the Australian States.  Independent 
assessments by the Commonwealth Grants Commission
7 (the Commission) indicate that 
States’ revenue capacities vary from about 75 per cent of the per capita Australian 
average to about 114 per cent of that average, largely due to variations in capacities 
arising from Payroll Tax, Land Revenue, Stamp Duty on Conveyances and Mining 
Revenue. 
With the exception of the Northern Territory, the States’ costs of providing the 
Australian average level of services are all assessed by the CGC to be within 10 per cent 
of the Australian average.  The Northern Territory, however, is measured as having a 
cost structure nearly 135 per cent higher than that average.  The major influences on this 
aspect of HFI arise from differences in the socio-economic and demographic 
composition of States’ populations, differences in the economies of scale in the 
provision of services, and differences in the spatial distribution of population within the 
States’ boundaries.  In each of these areas, the Northern Territory is greatly different to 
the other States, giving it a very different cost and demand structure for State services. 
HFI within the municipal sector in Australia is even larger than that experienced at the 
State level, particularly because of the different per capita capacities of local authorities 
to raise revenue.  However, because measurements of these differences are done within 
each State
8 and are not calculated on a fully uniform basis, it is not possible to give an 
accurate measure of the extent to which revenue capacities and costs of services differ 
between authorities. 
                                                 
7   The Commonwealth Grants Commission has responsibility for making recommendations to the 
Commonwealth Government on how untied financial assistance should be distributed between 
the States and is the subject of detailed discussion later in the paper. 
8   There is a Grants Commission established in each of the States and the Northern Territory under 
State law, to recommend the distribution of Commonwealth assistance to municipal government.  
They are required to use horizontal fiscal equalisation in their recommendations on the 







The Fiscal Transfers 
Transfers from the Commonwealth.  By far the largest transfer of funds within the 
Australian Federation is from the Commonwealth to the State and municipal 
governments. 
In 1999-2000, the Commonwealth transferred over $34 846 million to the State and 
municipal governments.  In addition, the Commonwealth spent another $414 million on 
the direct provision or subsidisation of  services that would otherwise have been the 
responsibility of those governments.  Table 2 summarises the transfers. 
Tied grants to the States are for use within the States’ budgets and fund normal 
activities of the States.  Tied grants through the States are for activities for which the 
States have constitutional authority but which do not influence their budgets; such as the 
activities of their municipal authorities, the provision of tertiary and primary and 
secondary schools run by religious and other non-government authorities. 
One of the largest specific purpose payments (SPPs) through the States is for local 
government.  In 1999-2000, it was about $1265 million.  This Commonwealth funding 
is about 11 per cent of municipal revenue and is tied only for the purpose of receipt by 
the States.  It is passed on to local governments, on the recommendations of the State 
Local Government Grants Commissions as untied funding. 
The direct funding of State-type services by the Commonwealth is largely in the areas 
of vocational education and training, and the provision of services for indigenous 
Australians.  Both are State functions but are now partly funded, with the agreement of 
the States, through statutory authorities of the Commonwealth.           
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Table 2  Commonwealth Transfers to Other Levels of Government  
1999-2000(a) 
Transfer    $m 
Untied Funds     
General Revenue Assistance  Current purpose  17 720 
     
Tied Funds - Specific Purpose Payments     
To the States (b)  Current purposes  10 789 
  Capital purposes  2 125 
'Through' the States     
  Current purposes  4 122 
  Capital purposes  90 
     
Direct Expenditure of subsidisation of State-type Services    414 
Total    35 260 
(a)  Based on data in Commonwealth Financial Relations with Other Levels of Government 1999-2000, 
Budget Document No. 3, AGPS, Canberra, 1999, and Commonwealth Grants Commission sources. 
(b)  $5677 million of this is for Health Care Grants which are distributed from the same pool as the 
General Revenue Assistance. 
Transfers from the States.  The States make no payments to the Commonwealth and 
their payments to municipal government are of little importance in the fiscal transfer 
system in Australia.   
The States are not generous in their assistance to the municipal sector, a situation that 
may be related to the States’ financial capacity and to the revenue bases they have given 
their municipalities.  Apart from the Northern Territory, States do not make untied 
grants to their local government authorities, although they all provide grants for specific 
projects or purposes.  The different policy in the Northern Territory could be a result of 
the much younger municipal sector in the Territory, and the stage of development of 
many of the indigenous communities that have recently been incorporated. 
In 1997-98, State grants of $850 million made up only 7 per cent of total municipal 
revenue.  The percentage contributed by the States varied from about 3 per cent in 






Transfers from the Municipal sector.  Except where  they are paying for services 
undertaken on their behalf (under contract), the municipal governments transfer no 
funds to either the States or the Commonwealth. 
Commonwealth Transfers to State Governments 
The transfers from the Commonwealth to the State sector are the major element of the 
fiscal transfer system in Australia and, as such, are the focus of this paper.  As indicated 
in Table 2, the payments are either specific purpose payments (SPPs) or general revenue 
grants (GRGs), although as noted earlier, the Commonwealth does not use the term 
GRG in relation to GST transfers. 
Under the IGA signed in 1 July 1999, a Ministerial Council for Commonwealth-State 
Financial Relations was established, comprising the Commonwealth and State 
Treasurers, to oversight the implementation of the Intergovernment Agreement.  The 
amount of Commonwealth General Revenue Assistance depends on the amount of GST 
revenue collected, except during the transition period from the old arrangements
9.  
The IGA also specifies that the interstate distribution of the GST will be based on per 
capita relativities determined by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, and the 
Ministerial Council also provides a forum for the discussion of those per capita 
relativities. 
This arrangement is intended to provide greater certainty in funding and to make 
Commonwealth-State relations more harmonious.  Previously, the total transfer was 
decided at an annual Premiers’ Conference when the Prime Minister and Treasurer of 
the Commonwealth met with the Premiers and Treasurers of the States to discuss the 
economic outlook and organise the fiscal transfer for the coming year.  Because it 
controlled the revenue, the Commonwealth had the upper hand in these discussions and 
the outcome did not often differ greatly from the ‘offer’ made to the States a few days 
before the Conference.  For practical purposes, the Commonwealth decided the value of 
                                                 
9   The IGA contains a guarantee that States would be no worse off under the new arrangements 
than had the former arrangements continued.  There is a transition period during which States 
may receive the guaranteed amount rather than the GST share.            
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the transfer in the context of the budgetary position in which it found itself that year.  
Because of the powerful position of the Commonwealth, the Premiers’ Conference was 
often seen as a waste of time and simply an opportunity for the States to blame the 
Commonwealth for any reductions in services or increases in State taxes, and to 
campaign for tax reform. 
The first Ministerial Council meeting to discuss the division of the GST revenue was 
held on 30 March 2001.  As expected, it did not result in any friction between the 
Commonwealth and the States on the size of the untied funds to be transferred, but it 
caused another reaction from the States.  New South Wales and Victoria, those that 
receive a much less than equal per capita share of funding under the HFE based 
relativities determined by the Commission, campaigned for a change to the basis of 
distribution.  The reaction of the Commonwealth and the other States was predictable.  
There is to be no change to the basis of distribution and the fiscal equalisation, which is 
covered by the IGS, is to be continued. 
One element of contention that will continue relates to the value of the Commonwealth 
SPPs.  Under the new arrangements, the absolute value of GRGs are tied to GST 
revenue collections.  However, the amounts of SPPs remain controlled by the 
Commonwealth Government.  Negotiations on SPPs are held by relevant Ministers and 
senior bureaucrats over a period of months.  Although the negotiating teams involved in 
the consideration of each SPP presumably have some instructions or guidelines from the 
Commonwealth Treasury and the Department of Finance and Administration, the total 
of the SPPs to be transferred seems to many to be no more than the accumulation of the 
individual outcomes of those negotiations.  There is no consolidated report on SPPs 
from the Commonwealth that details either the conditions of each transfer or the basis 
on which the distribution has been determined. 
It is too soon to judge how much better off the States will be under the new funding 
arrangements because there is a question of how much the Commonwealth will pay as 
SPPs in the future.  If GST revenue exceeds the Commonwealth's expectations (and the 
estimated collections for the first year have already been increased by about 10 per 
cent), it may wish to review the amounts paid as SPPs.  From their viewpoint, the States 






the new funding arrangements for GRGs.  They will claim the clause in the IGA that 
states that the Commonwealth does not intend to reduce the level of SPPs, but this is a 
very weak clause and few expect it to have any real power.  The Commonwealth will 
probably be able to act as it wishes. 
Specific Purpose Payments. Specific Purpose Payments to the States are used when the 
Commonwealth wishes to influence State expenditure priorities to satisfy national 
objectives.  These funds must be spent on particular functions and if properly used, they 
are probably the easiest means by which the Commonwealth could achieve performance 
equalisation for any particular service provided by the States. 
Since 1990-91, the Commonwealth has used over 90 different SPPs to transfer funds to 
the States.  This is not an accurate measure of the number of programs, however, 
because in some of them, government schools grants for example, there are a number of 
different sub-programs that are not detailed in the basic, but limited, reference document 
— Commonwealth Budget Paper No. 3, Commonwealth Financial Relations with other 
Levels of Government.  It is more likely that the number of SPPs and sub-programs 
exceeds 500. 
The Specific Purpose Payments through the States are the funds transferred to the States 
for activities not provided through State budgets.  The transfers are made in this way 
either as an administrative convenience or because the States rather than the 
Commonwealth have the constitutional authority to perform the function.   
It has been suggested earlier that the involvement of the Commonwealth in making 
payments for these functions was initiated, at least in part, because of the vertical fiscal 
imbalance in its favour. 
As Figure 2 shows, there has been a trend since the early 1990s for SPPs to make up 
about half the total grants from the Commonwealth to the States.  
The reasons for the two periods of increase in the proportion of SPPs over the last 25 
years have been quite different.  In 1972, Australia elected a new Commonwealth Labor 
Government after that party had been in opposition for 27 years, and it quickly 
expanded both the range and size of SPPs to initiate change and fulfil its social agenda.            
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The increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s was because the escalation arrangements 
relating to SPPs at that time were more generous than those relating to GRGs.  It can be 
seen that the new arrangements associate with the introduction of the GST will result in 
a slight lowering of the SPP proportion. 
Figure 2 - SPPs as a Proportion of Commonwealth Grants to the States 
 
It is impossible to comment with any authority about the influence of equity on the 
distribution of these fiscal transfers from the Commonwealth.  It is true, however, that 
the distribution of many of the major SPPs follows a pattern that is similar to that which 
the Commonwealth Grants Commission assesses as being appropriate if fiscal 
equalisation of the State Governments’ capacities was the objective.  It is also 
interesting to note that the distributions of some of the larger SPPs (such as those for 
health and education) have, over time, moved closer to the Commission’s assessments. 
The central Government can have a greater impact on the equitable provision of a 
service by State Governments if it uses SPPs rather than GRGs, because the decisions 
about the minimum level of service are being taken by it rather than the several State 
governments.  What is very difficult to achieve through SPPs, however, is an overall 
redistribution of fiscal capacity based on equity — it is difficult to use SPPs to adjust for 







































the use of untied grants and systems designed to adjust  funding for horizontal fiscal 
imbalances. 
General Revenue Grants.  As we have seen, untied funds (the GRGs) made up about 50 
per cent of the total transfer of funds from the Commonwealth to State Governments in 
Australia in 1999-2000 and are the largest s ingle avenue through which financial 
capacity is transferred.  The decisions on the size of the transfer are now covered by the 
IGA and the current rate of GST, 10 per cent, can only be varied by legislation with the 
unanimous support of the States and Commonwealth. 
The distribution of GRGs between the States is based on per capita relativities 
recommended by the Commonwealth Grants Commission.  The basis of these 
recommendations is the subject of detailed discussion later in this paper. 
Commonwealth Transfers to Municipal Government 
As stated earlier, the Commonwealth transfers about $1.265 billion a year to local 
government, through the States, as untied assistance.  There is also a small amount 
(about $200 million) passed to local government as tied assistance because it provides 
services for the Commonwealth on a contract basis. 
The untied assistance is passed to the States on condition that they establish a State 
Grants Commission that acts independently of the government to recommend the 
distribution to municipal government.  The Commonwealth requires the State Local 
Government Grants Commissions (LGGCs) to distribute the funds in three parts: 
about 20 per cent shared between each of the 730 local councils in Australia on an equal 
per capita basis; 
about 30 per cent shared between each Council ‘on the basis of the relative need of each 
local governing body for roads expenditure and to preserve its roads assets’; and 
about 50 per cent on the basis of fiscal equalisation. 
One of the conditions attaching to this transfer is that the Commonwealth has to approve 
the assessment methods of the LGGCs.  Until very recently, this has been done by the           
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Commonwealth Office of Local Government and has not involved the CGC.  As part of 
an inquiry it is currently undertaking, the CGC has examined the methods of the 
LGGCs and found that none of them apply fiscal equalisation as it does, and pointed out 
the natural conflicts between the objectives of the EPC and roads elements of the 
distribution, with the objective of fiscal equalisation.  A draft report it distributed for 
discussion in December 2000 suggested that changes need to be made both to the 
objectives that the Commonwealth has specified as the reasons for the grants, and the 
methods used by each of the LGGCs in implementing the Commonwealth’s objectives.  
The CGC’s final report on this inquiry is due in June 2001. 
THE COMMONWEALTH GRANTS COMMISSION 
Background and Method of Operation 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission is a small, independent, advisory body that 
was established in 1933.  It was established to reduce disquiet among the States on how 
federal funding was being distributed, and possibly as an incentive for the people of 
Western Australia (who had recently voted to succeed from Australia) to remain in the 
Commonwealth.  It has no Constitutional status but is widely seen as an integral 
element of Australia’s federal structure.   
Members of the Commission are appointed by the Commonwealth (on either a full-time 
or a part-time basis) after discussion of prospective candidates with the States.  The 
States in fact have an informal right of veto over nominees.  Commissioners are 
appointed for their expertise and experience and do not represent any jurisdiction or 
organisation when working on Commission business.  Appointees cannot be public 
sector employees and are usually drawn from academia, retired civil servants or 
business.  Appointments to the Commission can be for up to five years and Members 
can be reappointed.  It is usual to have no more than three or four Members of the 
Commission. 
The Commission is funded by the Commonwealth and has a professional staff of about 






Treasury, it is located in the Ministry of Finance and Administrative Services.  It has 
very little contact with the responsible Minister and operates as it sees fit once it has 
been given terms of reference for an inquiry. 
The Commission cannot initiate its own inquiries and operates only on terms of 
reference from its Minister, usually arrived at after negotiations between the 
Commonwealth and State Treasuries.  In carrying out its inquiries, the Commission 
treats the States and the Commonwealth as equals in its deliberations.  Although it 
presents its reports to a Commonwealth Minister, the Commission’s usual procedure is 
to release its findings to the States immediately afterwards.  Thus, although funded by 
the Commonwealth, the Commission could be seen to be working for the States — they 
are much more concerned about its findings than the Commonwealth which leaves the 
decisions on distribution very largely to the Commission. 
All proceedings of the Commission’s inquiries are open to the public and it freely 
discloses the detailed calculations behind its results and findings.  Every five years, 
coinciding with newly available census data, the Commission reviews all aspects of its 
data and method of calculating the relative shares of general revenue funds to go to each 
State.  In the intervening years, methods are unchanged and annual updates of the 
calculations incorporate the latest available data. 
The principle the Commission follows in arriving at its conclusions (except to the extent 
that it is told otherwise in the terms of reference) is that of horizontal fiscal equalisation, 
a principle it first enunciated in 1936.  It is: 
that each State should be given the capacity to provide the average 
standard of State-type public services, assuming it: 
?? operates at an average level of efficiency; and 
?? makes the average effort to raise revenue from its own 
sources. 
The Australian system is thus based on a principle of capacity equalisation within a 
federation.  The States are given the capacity to achieve inter-personal equalisation of           
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revenue imposts and receipt of services, but are left with the ultimate decisions of what 
levels of service are to be provided and what revenue efforts are to be made. 
The first step in the Commission’s application of the fiscal equalisation principle is to 
decide what range of State-type services and areas of revenue raising should be 
considered in the equalisation assessments.  The Commission last looked at this in detail 
in 1999 and decided to include all aspects of States’ normal recurrent budgetary 
activities.  It: 
brought depreciation into the scope of its assessments for the first time (the capital 
impacts through debt charges had been included previously); 
decided that all capital transactions should be excluded; 
excluded State spending on functions which are the financial responsibility of the 
Commonwealth, such as universities, even though they might remain the constitutional 
responsibility of the States; and 
excluded the activities of most government business enterprises (GBE), except for their 
interactions with the general budget sector — the payment by GBEs of dividends and 
tax equivalents or to them for community service obligations. 
A number of conclusions follow from the implementation of the fiscal equalisation 
principle, and some aspects of its application are worth noting. 
?? The Commission deals with capacity and not performance 
equalisation.  This is because Australia is a federation: the States 
have sovereign rights in functions they retained when the 
Constitution was written, and the grants the Commission is 
concerned with are untied grants.  The Commonwealth has no 
power to direct the States except through SPPs.  Capacity 
equalisation means that: 
? ?a State many choose to levy low taxes, and have a reduced 






? ?a State may choose to have high-quality public services in 
some functions, but this will mean either a lower standard of 
other services, higher taxes overall, or an increase in its debt;  
and 
? ?a State that is less careful about the efficiency of its operations 
will not be able to provide services at average standards unless 
it has higher than average tax rates or increased debt; 
?? the standard to which the Commission works is what has actually 
happened, what has actually been spent on a function, or raised in 
taxes  — not what any group of experts thinks should have 
happened; 
?? the Commission’s recommendations attempt to be policy neutral 
— as far as possible, the Commission tries to make sure that a 
State cannot get a larger share of the general revenue funding by 
changing its priorities or its policies;  and 
?? central to the Commission’s work is the need to measure or 
estimate ‘disabilities’.  These are  influences beyond a State’s 
control that require it to spend more (or less) to provide the same 
service as other States, or mean that it cannot raise as much 
revenue as (or can raise more than) other States from the same tax 
rates. 
Thus, as stated earlier, the sources of fiscal imbalance between States are: 
?? different per capita capacities for raising own-source r evenues;  
and 
?? different per capita costs in providing equivalent services. 
Revenue Assessments 
There are substantial differences between States in the per capita revenue they collect 
from their own taxes and charges (ranging, in 1999-2000, from $1284 per capita in           
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Tasmania to $2148 per capita in Victoria).  This is illustrated by Figure 3 which also 
shows the Australian per capita average, or standard, revenue collected by the States to 
be $2012. 
Figure 3 - Total Own-Source Revenue Per Capita – 1999-2000 
   
The differences in revenue collections are caused by: 
?? differences in the range of taxes levied; 
?? differences in the rates of tax charged; and 
?? differences in the capacity of States to raise revenue (ie revenue 
disabilities caused by differences in the economic and 
demographic positions of States which are beyond their control 
and which affect the size of their revenue bases). 
The first two groups of differences reflect policy choice by the State governments.  
Only the last one reflects non-policy influences that the Commission takes account of in 
its calculations.  To accept the first two as reasons for variation in the per capita 
relativities would be to allow the States to influence their own levels of funding.  This 
would destroy effort neutrality and be a serious inefficiency in the grant design system. 
The revenue assessments aim to measure the differences in the States’ capacities to raise 




















sources if it made the same revenue effort as all the other States – what the Commission 
terms standardised revenue.  It is what they would collect if they each imposed taxes at 
the average rates and collected their taxes with the average level of efficiency.  The 
measured differences in capacity thus arise only because of differences in the size and 
structure of the States’ revenue bases. 
The task of estimating States’ standardised revenues is similar to the Representative Tax 
System operated in many countries.  It involves: 
?? deciding how to group revenue sources for assessment purposes; 
?? identifying and measuring the revenue base for each group of taxes;  and 
?? measuring the standard revenue effort for each group of taxes. 
Grouping Revenue Sources.  After re-examining the scope and structure of its standard 
budget in 1999, the Commission concluded that 15 categories are needed to best 
measure the differences between States in their ability to raise revenue
10.  The 
classification, and the contribution of each category to total standard revenue, is shown 
in Attachment C. 
It can readily be seen that many of the States’ revenue sources, even in this grouped 
presentation, are only very small contributors to total own-source revenue.  This is 
indicative of the problems of inefficiency and splintering the States see in their tax bases 
and, together with the level of VFI, formed the basis for their case for tax reform. 
Measuring the Revenue Base.  Once the assessment categories are decided, the 
Commission defines the revenue base for each one.  Revenue bases are usually the 
legislative base for the tax and are measured as the number or value of activities or 
assets subject to tax in the majority of States.  For example, the revenue base for the 
taxes on motor vehicles is the number of vehicles (weighted by type); for stamp duty on 
conveyances, it is the value of land and other assets sold. 
                                                 
10   This standard budget used in the 2000 Update calculations also reflects the changes in State 
taxes as a result of the IGA.  The Commission has 'backcast' these for the purpose of calculating 
the per capita relativities to apply to the GST pool.  Thus revenues exclude franchise fees.             
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If no State, or virtually no State, taxes a part of the assumed revenue base, it is excluded 
from the measure of the revenue base.  For example, all States impose a land tax on 
property but most exempt residential properties, so these are excluded from the revenue 
base in all States.  Similarly, all States exempt small businesses from payroll tax and the 
Commission excludes the wages paid by such businesses from its assessments by 
adjusting data from which the revenue base is measured. 
In some instances, there are so many differences between States in how they impose a 
tax that it is impossible to get a common measure.  In these cases, the Commission 
looks for a measure that is related to the particular tax but, if one is not available, it uses 
a broad measure of economic activity such as household income, total private 
expenditure or industry profitability.  Mining revenue, where Western Australia has a 
much different policy to the others and where a measure of profitability is used, is an 
important example of where the Commission finds it necessary to apply this procedure. 
When measuring revenue bases, it is also necessary to consider whether the level of 
activity in a State is influenced by the rate of tax imposed on it — that is, whether there 
are price or supply elasticity effects.  For example, some States use taxation policy as a 
deliberate means of influencing economic development by encouraging mineral 
extraction.  Their revenue bases for mining, a measure of profitability, should be 
measured as if they operated at standard tax rates and, where necessary, the observed 
revenue base of a State is adjusted for such elasticities. 
Measuring the Standard Revenue Effort.  Revenue effort is influenced by many things, 
including the rate of tax, the exemptions and concessions, and the enforcement effort.  
The Commission summarises the effects of all these things into the standard effective 
rate of tax or standard revenue effort.  This is calculated as total revenue collected by all 
the States, divided by the total of their estimated revenue bases. 
Where there is a common policy among the States to apply progressive rates of tax (for 
example, in Payroll Tax), the assessments also take account of the differences between 
States in the value distribution of the taxable transactions.  In effect, this is done by 
dividing the revenue base of each State into common value ranges, and performing 






Estimating Standardised Revenues.  Estimating standardised revenue is achieved by 
multiplying each State's revenue base by the standard effective rate of tax.  As the 
process can be described very easily by example, the following discussion of the Payroll 
Tax assessment is used to illustrate the Commission’s revenue assessment method. 
The Payroll Tax Assessment.  States’ payroll taxes are collected from employers on the 
basis of the value of the wages and salaries paid.  The tax is in the range of 5 to 7 per 
cent of payrolls, depending on the jurisdiction and the value of the payroll.  All States 
exempt small employers from the tax but there are differences between them in the 
definition of a small employer (in one State it is annual payrolls below $456 000, but in 
another it is payrolls below $850 000). 
The revenue base is defined by the Commission as the estimated value of payrolls 
subject to tax: that is, the payrolls of public sector trading enterprises and private 
employers, except for small businesses where the payrolls are below the national 
average exemption level. 
The starting point for the measurement of this revenue base is data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics on aggregate compensation received by employees resident in each 
State.  As such, the data include payrolls that are not taxed.  The Commission therefore 
adjusts them for each State to exclude: 
(i)    payrolls attributable to the general government sector; and 
(ii)  the estimated gross payrolls of private sector businesses with 
less than 20 employees in Australia (this corresponds to 
payrolls of about $650 000). 
The adjustments are also based on data obtained from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. 
Because the payroll tax rates applied by the States are progressive, it is necessary to take 
account of differences between States in the distribution of payrolls by size bands.  This 
is done by dissecting the aggregate revenue base for each State into value groups, using 
details of payrolls and tax paid that are provided by the States from their tax collection 
records.  The States’ aggregate payroll tax assessments then become the accumulation           
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of the separate assessments made for each value range, by applying the average rate of 
tax in each value range to the States’ values of payrolls in each of those value ranges. 
Figure 4 summarises the payroll taxation assessments for 1999-2000.  It shows that New 
South Wales and Victoria had above average revenue raising capacity and that the other 
States had below average capacity. 
The above average capacities in New South Wales and Victoria arose because: 
(i)    the wages, salaries and supplements per head of population in those 
States exceeded the Australian average; 
(ii)   the proportion of total wages, salaries and supplements attributable to 
private sector employers with more than 20 employees in those States 
exceeded the Australian average proportion;  and 
(iii)  New South Wales had an above average proportion of large payrolls. 
 
Figure 4 - Payroll Tax Assessments - 1999-2000  
 
Comparisons between the actual and standardised revenue for each State indicate how 
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Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory clearly 
exceeded their standardised revenues because: 
(i)  these States applied the highest rates of tax; and 
(ii)  the low tax effort in Queensland brought the standard down and therefore 
reduced all States’ standardised capacities. 
The actual revenue of Queensland was well below its standardised revenues because it 
applied the lowest rates of payroll tax and had the highest exemption level.  The rates of 
tax in Western Australia were also below average. 
Total Revenue Assessments.  Taking all 15 revenue assessments together, Figure 5 
compares the revenue each State actually collected in 1998-99 with the Commission’s 
assessments of what it would have collected under standard conditions.  As discussed 
earlier, it is the standardised levels of expenditure that are used in the final 
determination of the States’ relative levels of untied funding.           
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Figure 6 shows the Commission’s assessments of States’ overall relative revenue raising 
capacities, by expressing the standardised revenue assessments as a percentage of the 
average.  Tasmania, the poorest State, has a capacity 27 per cent below average.  
Western Australia, with its vast mineral resources, is assessed by the Commission as 























The Commission undertakes expenditure assessments in each of the 43 categories into 
which it classifies State recurrent expenditure.  It is this that makes it different to all 
other equalisation systems in the world.  Only a handful of other nations include 
assessments of expenditure needs in their untied grant determination processes, and then 
it is done by general indicators rather than a quantified assessment of needs in each 
functional area. 
The functions used by the Commission are shown in Attachment D.  As indicated 
earlier, the assessments are based on the calculation of disabilities (which can be either 
negative or positive), and are defined as: 
influences beyond the States’ control that result in them having to 
outlay different per capita levels of expenditure to achieve the same 
objective. 
The expenditure approach is somewhat different to that used for the revenue 
assessments.  They take a much more direct approach at identifying and quantifying 
what causes the differences the States face.           
 
30      
 
Disability Factors.  Disabilities generally reflect differences in the social, physical and 
economic structure of the States.  For discussion purposes, we find it useful, in 
considering expenditure disabilities, to distinguish between demand influences and cost 
influences.  In practise, this distinction is not always clear but some examples might 
assist the explanation. 
The most frequently used disability factor that relates to demand is based on differences 
in the socio-demographic composition of the States’ populations.  T his takes into 
account differences in the characteristics of State populations (such as age-sex, 
Aboriginality and income levels) on demand for and unit costs of services.  For 
example, differences in the age distributions of population affect the demand f or a 
number of services.  Persons of school-age require education services; many elderly 
persons require nursing home services; and males in the late teens or early twenties are 
more likely than others to generate police services.   
Similarly, differences between States in the proportion of persons of Aboriginal 
background affects the relative demand for and cost of providing health services.  (The 
proportion of persons of Aboriginal descent is particularly high in the Northern 
Territory.)  The numbers of migrants from different language groups affects the costs of 
services through the need for interpreter services; or through more complex problems 
because they seek services later (health services in particular).  The effects of such 
demographic characteristics on costs are complex and the information available to 
measure them is often sparse. 
Another demand influence is the cross-border factor.  This measures the net effects on 
a State’s costs of: 
?? use by its inhabitants of services provided by other States;  and 
?? use of its services by the inhabitants of other States. 
The major instance of cross-border use of services in Australia is the flow of people into 
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) from the surrounding State of New South Wales.  
The ACT services most used by the residents of New South Wales are hospitals, 






to the assessment for this movement, the ACT would receive insufficient funds to 
provide the standard level of services, and New South Wales would receive too much. 
Looking now at some influences on the unit cost of services, the  location of the 
population in the vast areas of Australia is an obvious cause of cost differences  Other 
things being equal, a m ore dispersed population costs more to service than a more 
concentrated one.  The costs of telephone communication are greater over longer 
distances; travel in connection with the provision of services is more expensive; the 
average cost of freighting goods or transferring staff is greater; and the cost of 
compensating staff for working in remote and harsh locations may be greater.  
Population dispersion factors aim to measure and allow for differences in the influence 
of these types of costs. 
Beyond a certain point of population concentration, however, urbanisation adds to costs.  
A large enough urban area will require the provision of a public transport service 
(nearly always at a net cost in Australia), and the larger the city the greater need for 
railways (nearly always more demanding on the budget than road transport). 
Another cost differential arises from differences in economies of scale.  The 
Commission measures these at two levels. 
?? Administrative scale relates to the additional expenditure of the 
States not able to take advantage of the economies of scale 
available to the more populous States.  It concerns mainly policy 
development and administrative tasks carried out in central and 
regional offices, or specialised services (such as the legislature) 
provided centrally for the whole of a State’s population. 
?? Service delivery scale refers to the differential costs of providing 
services at the point of service delivery (a school or a police 
station) arising from lower efficiency, because of population 
sparsity, in the use of staff and other resources at service outlets.           
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The last example to be discussed is input costs.  The Commission has taken the view 
that the costs of some basic inputs into State government service provision are not 
within, or fully within, the States’ control.  A very important example is wages. 
Salaries and related costs are a high proportion of total expenditure on State-government 
functions.  The wage levels which a State pays its employees is determined more by the 
general economic climate in the State, or by the centralised wage-setting system that 
operated in Australia until very recently, than by any action or inaction of the State 
Government. 
The statistics clearly show, for example, that the level of private-sector wages in New 
South Wales (Sydney in particular) are higher than elsewhere in Australia.  It would be 
surprising indeed if there were no flow-on effects into the State public sector.  
Obviously, however, States have some influence on the level of wages they pay, and the 
Commission has therefore approached the estimation of wage cost disability factors 
very cautiously. 
Measuring and combining disabilities.  The Commission measures all State disabilities 
from their position relative to the Australian average.  For example, a State would have 
a disability in providing services to the aged if the proportion of its population over 60 
years was greater than the Australian average. 
In combining disabilities, the Commission first estimates the proportion of the 
expenditure to which the particular disability applies and weights the disability factor 
accordingly.  Some disabilities are combined by multiplication because they interact 
with others (particularly input costs), but many are independent of each other and are 
therefore added. 
The Government Schools, Secondary Education Assessment.  Government Schools, 
Secondary Education is a useful example through which to explain the process for an 
expenditure category.  Table 3 shows that the Commission assessed ten disability 
factors and combined their effects into an overall ‘category disability’.  It shows that 
Queensland had a disadvantage of over 10 per cent over the Australian average because 
of its high social-demographic composition  factor, but it had an advantage of 34 per 






weighting the disabilities by the proportion of expenditure affected by each of them — 
the component weight — and adding the weighted disabilities, Queensland's overall 
cost of providing the Australian average level of service was 8.57 per cent above 
average. 
In simple terms, and again using Queensland as the example, the Commission calculates 
its standardised expenditure as the Australian average per capita standard, multiplied by 
1.08570, multiplied by the Queensland population. 
Table 3 - Government Secondary Education Disability Factors – 1999-2000 
Factors  NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
SCALE AFFECTED EXPENDITURE (component weight = 0.78%)       
Administrative scale  0.586743  0.668812  0.780304 1.208601 1.391171  3.491858 5.132463  8.761363
Input costs  1.015777  0.996259  0.979643 1.010858 0.979122  0.980694 1.022189  1.007066
Component factor  0.596  0.66631  0.764419 1.221724 1.362127  3.424446 5.246347  8.823267
Cont. to category factor  0.004668  0.005219  0.005987 0.009569 0.010669  0.026821 0.041091  0.069106
SCHOOLS (component weight = 97.98%)           
Dispersion  0.994252  0.990093  1.010361 1.022916 0.992867  0.995819 0.983188  1.114476
Input costs  1.014144  0.996476  0.981856 1.010024 0.981326  0.982526 1.019314  1.006768
Service delivery scale  0.99406  0.992454  1.002996 1.006218 1.007992  1.040106 0.960583  1.10444
Socio-demographic 
composition  0.967334  0.881353  1.108669 1.169204 0.984033  1.114196 0.997942  1.220571
Grade cost  1.001585  1.002483  0.996453 0.995592 0.999018  1.003426 1.009146  1.000371
Cross border  0.998254  1  1 1 1  1 1.031622  1
Component factor  0.969502  0.865097  1.099422 1.209871 0.965351  1.137669 1.00046  1.512052
Cont. to category factor  0.948838  0.846659  1.075989 1.184084 0.944776  1.113421 0.979137  1.479825
ISOLATION (component weight = 0.2%)           
Isolation  0.043153  0.062041  0.119353 2.339621 0.294369  3.646341 1.11538  57.55709
Component factor  0.043153  0.062041  0.119353 2.339621 0.294369  3.646341 1.11538  57.55709
Cont. to category factor  8.63E-05  0.000124  0.000239 0.004679 0.000589  0.007293 0.002231  0.115114
VANDALISM (component weight = 1%)           
Vandalism and security  1.15734  1.284051  0.661745 0.799249 0.834124  0.448186 0.701153  0.351869
Component factor  1.15734  1.284051  0.661745 0.799249 0.834124  0.448186 0.701153  0.351869
Cont. to category factor  0.011538  0.012801  0.006597 0.007968 0.008315  0.004468 0.00699  0.003508
NATIONAL CAPITAL (component weight = 0.04%)         
National capital  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 61.0566  0
Component factor  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 61.0566  0
Cont. to category factor  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 0.024565  0
CATEGORY FACTOR  0.96513  0.864802  1.088812 1.2063 0.964348  1.152003 1.054013  1.667553
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Putting this assessment into the standard presentation  gives us Figure 7 where 
Queensland’s overall disability is represented by the amount of standardised 
expenditure above the standard line of $306.92 per capita.   The large disability faced by 
the Northern Territory is also very obvious. 
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Total Expenditure Assessments.  Taking the combined assessments for all 43 
expenditure functions, the Commission’s assessments of States’ relative costs of 
providing services is shown in Figure 8.  Apart from the Northern Territory, with its 
small population scattered over a large area (200 000 people in 1.35 million km
2), the 
Commission does not believe there to be great differences between the States.  Victoria 
has the lowest cost at about 7 per cent below the national average.  In Tasmania, costs 






Figure 8 - Relative Cost of Service Provision Ratios – 1999-2000 













NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
%
 
Equity and the Treatment of Specific Purpose Payments 
The issue that now remains unanswered is how the Commonwealth’s distribution of 
specific purpose payments (SPPs) between the States is taken into account by the 
Commission. 
The necessity f or the Commission to consider how to treat SPPs within its processes 
comes direct from the principle of fiscal equalisation.  The Commission is asked to 
work on the basis that each State should be given the capacity to provide the average 
level of services.  The question then is: 
should the average level of services that is being considered include 
those funded by specific purpose payments? 
The Commission believes that it cannot fulfil its objective of equalising States’ 
capacities to provide services unless, in many cases, it includes those services funded by 
SPPs in its measurement of average levels of service, because the SPPs are contributing 
to States’ capacities to fund services.  It therefore takes the variation in the receipt of 
SPPs paid to the States into account in arriving at its overall measure of States’ needs           
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for general revenue funding.  It terms this procedure for treating SPPs the ‘inclusion 
approach’. 
The levels of standard expenditure therefore includes the expenditure funded from the 
SPPs, and the SPPs are deducted from the Commission’s assessment of what each State 
needs to spend to provide the standard level of services  – its total expenditure 
requirement.  Results based on the use of this ‘inclusion approach’ thus adjust a State’s 
level of untied financial assistance to take account of differences in the States’ receipts 
of SPPs that cannot be justified by the Commission as resulting from differences in 
relative need. 
With one exception, the relative levels of the States’ receipts of SPPs is not dramatic.  It 
is shown in Figure 9.  The exception in the Northern Territory results from that State’s 
high demand and costs of services, but it is not quite as high as the Commission’s 
assessments of the Territory’s expenditure needs shown in Figure 8.  The level of 
receipt in Western Australia is influenced by that State being the sole recipient of an 
SPP to cover a royalty equivalent to on-shore petroleum production, which is easier to 
levy if combined with the Commonwealth’s off-shore levy.  
This treatment of SPPs fits into the model the Commission uses to determine the per 
capita relativities because each State’s need for united grants is measured, in per capita 
terms, as: 
      its Standardised Expenditure 
    plus  the Standard Budget Result 
    less  its Standardised Revenue 
    less  its receipt of SPPs treated by the inclusion method. 
The standard budget result is simply the difference between total per capita expenditure 
and total per capita revenue included in the standard budget.  There is no requirement 
for the Australian States to operate on a balanced budget and the Commission’s 
standard budget therefore never balances.  The assumption within the current 
assessment model is that the States have the same per capita capacity to operate at a 






Figure 9  States’ Relative Receipt of Specific Purpose Payments Treated by 
Inclusion, 1999-2000 
   
The inclusion approach is one of three ways in which SPPs are treated by the 
Commission.  The three approaches and the decision framework used to decide when 
each is used, are provided in Attachment E. 
Combining the assessments. The final outcome of the Commission’s considerations is a 
set of per capita relativities which are its recommendations concerning the relative 
levels of per capita grant to which each State is entitled.  The per capita relativities 
recommended in the Commission’s 2001 Update Report
11 were: 
                                                 
11   Per capita relativities for distribution of the pool of GST revenue and health grants based on 
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State  Relativity 
New South Wales  0.92186 
Victoria  0.87625 
Queensland  1.00470 
Western Australia  0.96275 
South Australia  1.18043 
Tasmania  1.50109 
Australian Capital Territory  1.14778 
Northern Territory  4.02230 
Australia  1.00000 
 
The application of these relativities in the grant distribution process (adjusted for the 
distribution of Hospital Funding Grants) is such that, compared to  the Australian 
average of about $1437 per capita, New South Wales will receive only $1295 per capita 
and the Northern Territory will receive $6773 per capita. 
Some Difficulties 
The degree of equalisation.  Australia has lived for a long time with a very detailed and 
complete equalisation system.  It has suited the nation’s purposes well but is coming 
under increasing pressure as the general ideal of equality of opportunity that was part of 
the ‘Aussie image’ decreases over time.  The more populous States of New South Wales 
and Victoria are applying increasingly greater political pressure to the system and 
challenging the extent to which their citizens are ‘subsidising’ those of the other States.  
To date, these pressures have been withstood by the other States and equalisation 
continues to be applied, but it is possible that this will change in the future as other 
States, most likely Western Australia and Queensland, join the group in complaint.  If 
there is a move away from the complete application of equalisation, however, Australia 
will at least know what it is moving from and will be in a better position to make 






The use of the inclusion approach to SPPs.  Not all States and not all Commonwealth 
Government Departments responsible for SPPs agree with the application of the 
inclusion approach and the issue is frequently raised for discussion.  It is one of the 
most controversial aspects of the Commission's work.  Few doubt that it is necessary to 
achieve fiscal equalisation, but that is not the only objective of government, and how 
should other objectives be weighed against fiscal equalisation?. 
The most common criticism of the Commission’s use of the inclusion approach is that it 
overrides the distribution of the specific purpose payment — a distribution arrived at 
after sometimes long and difficult negotiations before agreement is reached and signed 
by Commonwealth and State Ministers or senior officials on behalf of their 
governments. 
In one sense, the Commission agrees with this criticism in that the financial distribution 
is over-ridden, but this occurs up to seven years after the event because the Commission 
(as instructed in its terms of reference) uses the previous completed five years on which 
to base its assessments.  It is important to note, however, that the policy objectives are 
not influenced by the over-riding of the financial distribution.  SPPs are usually 
distributed with a prospective view in mind, while GRGs are based on the analysis of 
retrospective data and (largely) on the assumption that nothing has changed.  These 
points often appear to be overlooked by the critics. 
The Commission also notes that relativities based on the inclusion approach neither 
redistribute the actual levels of SPPs received in past years nor influence the distribution 
of such payments in future years; the process only adjusts the distribution of general 
revenue grants in a future year to reflect the requirements of fiscal equalisation based on 
the analysis of a past period. 
Data requirements.  There is some criticism of the Commission on the grounds that its 
processes are too resource intensive and its data requirements too demanding.  Work 
done by the Commission, however, indicates that very few SPPs have as small a ratio of 
administrative cost to amount distributed as the untied grant distribution system. 
Generally on the issue of data requirements, it is true that the Commission has been the 
cause of a great expansion in management data relating to the public sector in Australia.            
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This is not a bad thing, however, as the ‘new’ data are used in making budgetary and 
other decisions and have greatly improved the basis of policy advice being given to the 
elected representatives.   
The Involvement of Politics 
To a very large degree, the existence and operations of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission have minimised the involvement of politicians, both Commonwealth and 
State, in the grant distribution system.  The Premiers and Treasurers of New South 
Wales and Victoria have become a little more politically active on the issue of whether 
equalisation should apply, but no politicians are involved in debate with the 
Commission.  There is no attempt to put political pressure on the Members and no 
contact between politicians and the Members when the results of the Commission’s 
deliberations are announced. 
In this way, Australia has been able to allow the elected representatives to concern 
themselves with the issues of VFI, and has handed the more technical issue of 
overcoming HFI to a specialist body. 
The Involvement of the States 
Because of the importance of the Commission’s work to the States, they are directly 
involved in all its procedures.  This has been the case since the Commission’s 
establishment in the 1930s and is seen as integral to the Australian system.  The extent 
of this contact, and the openness of the Commission’s work to examination by the 
States, contribute greatly to the acceptance of the results (technically if not politically, 
the Commission’s work is still highly regarded).   
The involvement of the States in selecting Commissioners was outlined earlier.  For the 
five-yearly reviews of the data and methods used to make the assessments, the States: 
?? assist the Commonwealth in developing the terms of reference for 






?? assist the Commission in designing the events and timetable for 
the inquiry; 
?? assist in deciding the scope and structure of the standard budget, 
and the specification of other data collections; 
?? provide the data requested, both financial and non-financial; 
?? arrange for the Commission to visit State workplaces to get first-
hand experience of disabilities and talk to service providers; 
?? make written submissions to the Commission on all aspects of the 
inquiry; 
?? attend conferences with the Commission and the other States to 
discuss the issues;  and 
?? examine the Commission’s preliminary findings and meet with it 
and the other States to discuss them. 
For its part, the Commission makes all submissions public, holds all its discussions in 
public and makes sure that any information given to one State is given to all the others.  
It makes at least summaries of all its work available to the States for examination as 
soon as the results of the inquiry are known, and makes further details, and even the 
minutes of its meetings, available on request once an inquiry has been completed. 
The States have the results of an inquiry, and many of the calculations behind those 
results, for up to six weeks before the Report is discussed at a meeting of the Ministerial 
Council for Commonwealth-State Financial Relations.  During that period, they act as 
very efficient ‘auditors’ of the Commission’s work and are supplied with any alternative 
calculations they require. 
CONCLUSION 
The Australian system of fiscal transfers has many good aspects to it but also has some 
problems.  The work of the Commonwealth Grants Commission is the most developed 
approach to fiscal equalisation in the world, and is being studied with interest by a           
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number of countries wanting to establish or reform their intergovernment fiscal transfer 
systems. 
Some parts of the Australian system however  — like the level of vertical fiscal 
imbalance, deciding the absolute level of the intergovernment transfer and the mix of 
tied and untied grants within that transfer — are not ideal. 
The important thing to note is that it was designed for Australia and works fairly well in 
Australia.  While it might be of interest to other nations, it is always necessary to design 
a system that suits the political and cultural environment of the nation to which it is to 
be applied. 
For those from other countries that study the Australian system, the things of most 
interest seem to be: 
?? the size of the VFI and the support for this by many in the 
Commonwealth Government; 
?? the apparent lack of control over the size of the total transfer from 
the Commonwealth to the States, and its allocation between SPPs 
and GRGs; 
?? the independence of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, and 
that its Members are not political appointments and do not 
represent any authority other than themselves; 
?? the comprehensiveness of Australia’s horizontal equalisation 
system; 
?? the Commission’s approach to expenditure assessments; 
?? the interface between the distribution of general revenue grants 
and the distribution of SPPs;  and 
?? the openness of the Commission’s processes and the involvement 
of the States as both a source of debate and information, and as 







Basic Data on States and Territories 
  NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
Area and Population                 
Area (km
2)  801 600  227 600  1 727 
200 
2 525 500  984 000  67 800  2 400  1 346 
200 
Coastline (km)  1900  1 800  7 400  12 500  3 700  3 200    6 200 
Population (1998-99)  6 367 287  4 682 951  3 480 
317 
1 844 559  1 489 
570 





2  7.94  20.58  2.02  0.73  1.51  6.95  128.54  0.14 
Population Characteristics                 
Net interstate migration 
(%,1999) 
-0.23  0.09  050  0.10  -0.19  -0.78  -0.39  -0.49 
Capital city population (%, 
1999) 
63.0  72.5  45.6  73.3  73.2  41.3  100.0  45.7 
Population under 15 (% 1999  20.5  20.0  21.2  21.2  19.6  21.2  20.8  26.1 
Population over 64 (% 1999  12.8  12.7  11.4  10.6  14.4  13.5  8.2  3.4 
Persons with low fluency in 
English (%, 1996) 
3.94  4.33  1.21  2.05  2.32  0.39  1.98  7.41 
Indigenous population (1996)  109 925  22 598  104 817  56 205  22 051  15 322  3 058  51 876 
Standardised death rate per 
‘000 population (1998) 
6.0  5.8  6.1  5.8  6.0  6.3  5.4  8.9 
Perinatal death rate per ‘000 
live births (1993) 
8.5  7.5  8.1  7.3  7.6  9.5  7.2  19.3 
Aged 15-69 with post-
school qualifications (% of 
all aged 15-69) 
43.7  38.1  36.9  42.1  38.2  36.7  48.9  37.1 
Income characteristics                 
Gross State Product per capita 
($’000, 1998-99) 
33.3  32.3  27.5  34.2  27.2  23.6  39.0  33.8 
Household disposable income 
per capita ($’000, 1998-99) 
29.2  27.9  24.8  27.0  25.1  22.9  38.2  27.2 
Housing affordability                 
Proportion of income devoted 
to Home Loan Repayments 
(June 1999)
 
28.4  22.9  22.8  21.0  19.6  19.1  14.3  15.0 
Mean weekly capital city rent 
(June1999) 
216  200  169  156  163  150  174  254           
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Attachment B 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia - An Extract 
Part V.- Powers of the Parliament 
51.  The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for 
the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:- 
  (i)  trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States: 
  (ii)  taxation;  but so as not discriminate between States or parts of States: 
  (iii)  bounties on the production or export of goods, but so that such bounties 
shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth: 
  (iv)  borrowing money on the public credit of the Commonwealth: 
  (v)  postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services: 
  (vi)  the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several 
States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of 
the Commonwealth: 
  (vii)  lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys: 
  (viii)  astronomical and meteorological observations: 
  (ix)  quarantine: 
  (x)  fisheries in  Australian waters beyond territorial limits: 
  (xi)  census and statistics: 
  (xii)  currency, coinage, and legal tender: 
  (xiii)  banking, other than State banking;  also State banking extending beyond 
the limits of the State concerned, the incorporate of banks, and the issue 
of paper money: 
  (xiv)  insurance, other than State insurance;  also State insurance extending 
beyond the limits of the State concerned: 






  (xvi)  bills of exchange and promissory notes: 
  (xvii)  bankruptcy and insolvency: 
  (xviii)  copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks: 
  (xix)  naturalisation and aliens: 
  (xx)  foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within 
the limits of the Commonwealth: 
  (xxi)  Marriage: 
  (xxii)  Divorce and matrimonial causes;  and in relation thereto, parental rights, 
and the custody and guardianship of infants: 
  (xxiii)  invalid and old-age pensions: 
  (xxiiiA)  the provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child 
endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital 
benefits, medical and dental service (but not so as to authorise any form 
of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances:  
[inserted by No. 81, 1946, s. 2] 
  (xxiv)  the service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and 
criminal process and the judgments of the courts of the States: 
  (xxv)  the recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws, the public 
Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the States. 
  (xxvi)  the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for 
whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws:  [altered by No. 55, 
1967, s. 2] 
  (xxvii)  immigration and emigration: 
  (xxviii)  the influx of criminals: 
  (xxix)  external affairs: 
  (xxx)  the relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific: 
  (xxxi)  the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any 
purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws:           
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  (xxxii)  the control of railways with respect to transport for the naval and military 
purposes of the Commonwealth: 
  (xxxiii)  the acquisition, with the consent of a State, or any railways of the State 
on terms arranged between the Commonwealth and the State: 
  (xxxiv)  railway construction and extension in any State with the consent of that 
State: 
  (xxxv)  conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State: 
  (xxxvi)  matters in respect of which this Constitution makes provision until the 
Parliament otherwise provides: 
  (xxxvii)  matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the 
Parliament of Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the law shall 
extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, or 
which afterwards adopt the law: 
  (xxxviii)  the exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the 
concurrence of the parliaments of all the States directly concerned, of 
any power which can at the establishment of this Constitution be 
exercised only the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal 
Council of Australasia: 
  (xxxix)  matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this 
Constitution in the Parliament or either House thereof, or in the 
Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in 







Commonwealth Grants Commission Standard Budget 1999-2000 - Revenue 
Revenue Classification Category  $pc  Per cent 
Taxation     
Payroll Taxation 
459.26  18.54 
Land Revenue 
102.4  4.13 
Stamp Duty on Conveyances 
267.1  10.78 
Financial Transaction Taxes 
104.23  4.21 
Stamp Duties on Shares and Securities 
3.93  0.16 
Gambling Taxation 
168.04  6.78 
Insurance Taxation 
60.23  2.43 
Heavy Vehicle Registration Fees and Taxes 
25.4  1.03 
Other Vehicle Registration Fees and Taxes 
123.91  5.00 
Stamp Duty on Vehicle Registration/Transfers 
70.64  2.85 
Drivers' Licence Fees 
13.15  0.53 
Other Taxation 
13.67  0.55 
Interest Earnings 
136.37  5.51 
Mining Revenue 
69.89  2.82 
Contributions By Trading Enterprises 
394.24  15.92 
  Sub-total Taxation  
2012.46  81.24 
User Charges 
   
Vocational Education and Training 
32.74  1.32 
Hospital Patient Fees 
48.36  1.95 
 
81.31  3.28 
Law and Order Fees and Fines 
40.72  1.64 
Property Titles 
33.91  1.37 
Public Safety and Emergency Services 
49.15  1.98 
National Parks and Wildlife Services 
3.64  0.15 
Aboriginal Community Services  0.00  0.00 
Primary Industry  
19.54  0.79 
Roads 
34.09  1.38 
Regulatory and Other Services 
20.52  0.83 
Other User Charges 
100.60  4.06 
  Sub-total User charges 
464.59  18.76 
Total Revenue (a) 
2477.05  100.00           
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(a)  Total own source revenue differs from the amount shown in Commonwealth Grants Commission 
Report on State Revenue Sharing Relativities 20001 Update, Supplementary Information p 43 
because user charges have been included. 
 
Attachment D 
Commonwealth Grants Commission Standard Budget 1999-2000 - Expenditure 
Expenditure Classification Category  $pc  Per cent 
Pre-school Education 
20.95  0.45 
Government Schools Education 
656.96  14.05 
Government Secondary Education 
193.13  4.13 
Non-government Secondary Education 
171.29  3.66 
Vocational Education and Training 
0.91  0.02 
Transport of Rural School Children 
29.51  0.63 
Hospitals 
601.16  12.86 
Nursing Homes 
10.73  0.23 
Mental Health 
79.30  1.70 
Community Health 
212.40  4.54 
Public Health 
44.14  0.94 
Police 
183.85  3.93 
Administration of Justice  
77.28  1.65 
Corrective Services 
63.02  1.35 
Public Safety and Emergency Services 
61.04  1.31 
Housing 
89.33  1.91 
less Housing User Charges 
-81.31  -1.74 
First Home Owners Scheme 
40.92  0.88 
Family and Child Welfare 
69.31  1.48 
Aged and Disabled Welfare 
138.31  2.96 
Other Welfare 
29.39  0.63 
Concessions and Other Payments - Electricity and Gas 
50.97  1.09 
Concessions and Other Payments - Water Supply and Sewerage 
30.10  0.64 
Concessions and Other Payments - Freight 
33.60  0.72 
Concessions and Other Payments - Non-urban Passenger Transport 
25.79  0.55 
Concessions and Other Payments - Other Trading Enterprises 
19.08  0.41 
Concessions and Other Payments - Other 
12.41  0.27 
Culture and Recreation 
65.12  1.39 
National Parks and Wildlife Services 






Aboriginal Community Services 
7.53  0.16 
Superannuation 
590.76  12.63 
GST Administration Costs 
123.77  2.65 
Other General Public Services 
24.96  0.53 
Primary Industry 
83.20  1.78 
Mining, Fuel and Energy 
20.05  0.43 
Tourism 
19.66  0.42 
Manufacturing and Other Industry 
20.76  0.44 
Subsidies – Petroleum Products 
27.93  0.60 
Subsidies - Alcohol Products 
6.18  0.13 
Urban Transit 
81.06  1.73 
Roads 
130.56  2.79 
Debt Charges nec 
182.32  3.90 
Depreciation 
333.43  7.13 
Regulatory and Other Services 
62.52  1.34 
Total Expenditure(a) 
4675.90  100.00 
(a)  Total expenditure differs from the amount shown in Commonwealth Grants Commission Report on 
State Revenue Sharing Relativities 2001 Update, Supplementary Information p 43 because user 
charges have not been offset. 
 
Attachment E 
The Treatment of Specific Purpose Payments 
The inclusion approach discussed in the paper is one of three ways in which SPPs are 
treated by the Commonwealth Grants Commission.  In summary, the three approaches 
can be explained as follows: 
(i)  The inclusion method, where expenditures financed from the SPP 
and from State sources are both included in the standards used in 
the expenditure assessments.  The SPP itself is treated as part of 
the Commonwealth revenue payments available to finance part of 
the total financial assistance requirement of each State. 
(ii)  The  exclusion method, where the payment and expenditure 
funded from it are removed from the revenue and expenditure 
standards used in the assessments.           
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(iii)  The absorption method, where expenditures financed from the 
SPP and from State sources are included in the expenditure 
standards.  The SPP is treated as though it were part of the general 
revenue pool distributed among the States. 
The treatment given each SPP is arrived at separately after the Commission has asked 
itself the questions illustrated in Figure E-1. 
Figure E-1   TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC PURPOSE PAYMENTS 
Does the SPP provide assistance for a
standard budget function? NO, out of scope
Should the interstate distribution of the
SPP influence the relativities?
(1)  Is the payment a reimbursement for
services provided to or for the
Commonwealth?
(2)  Should the payment be excluded for
simplicity because it is distributed
consistently with Commission
assessments of State needs?
(3)  Is the payment a minor payment  for
which needs are not assessed and the
introduction of additional disability
factors into the assessment would not
be warranted?
(4)  Is there a constraint on State budgets
not allowed for in the assessment?
ABSORPTION
EXCLUSION
YES
(to any)
INCLUSION
 
 
No 
Yes 